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Until the early 1990s or so, infrastructure industries—energy, ports, railways, 
roads, telecommunications and water & sewerage— were generally almost exclusively a 
public sector responsibility. This has changed. Private corporations— often not local— 
are now an actor in roughly 40-50% of the countries of the world in some key dimension 
of  large-scale service delivery—the average is somewhat higher for developed countries 
than for developing countries and for some sectors than for others as discussed later.
1  
For developing and transition economies, there were at least three main drivers 
behind this transformation. The first was a change in ideology. The high profile of the, 
then, very atypical 1970s British and Chilean experiences with market oriented 
privatization, were the results of political reversals in these two countries. These real life 
laboratories of the competition cum privatization experiments eased the large-scale 
replications of the 1990s. British and Chilean experts traveled the world during the 1980s 
“selling” their experiences to curious audiences from Africa, Latin America, Asia and 
later Eastern Europe.  
The second change engine was technological. The telecommunication revolution 
is well known and has been internalized in the most remote areas of the world. Not quite 
as spectacular as in telecoms, technological changes have however also reached almost 
all other sectors in poor countries. From more cost effective small water systems to 
spectacularly performing low cost small-scale solar generators, technological progress is 
slowly but surely changing the market structure in water and energy service delivery in 
developing countries. The transport sector has not been left behind. Its most obvious 
technological change is the explosion of the containerization of a large share of the 
freight traffic. Equipment, such as cranes,  rolling stocks and even trucks, are indeed also 
adjusting as a result. Most of these changes have allowed major sector restructuring and 
in particular the unbundling of competitive segments of businesses from the residual 
monopoly segments. The implementation of the competition dimension of the ideological 
revolution was, to a large extent, allowed by this technological revolution across sectors. 
The third engine of reform is the fiscal crisis of the 1980s to the mid-1990s in 
most developing and transition economies.
2 Governments could no longer afford the high 
costs of the historically high inefficiency levels and of the resulting subsidy demands of 
the sector. Moreover, governments had long stopped significant investment in the sector. 
As a consequence service coverage rates had been stagnating, at best catching up with 
population growth. Many of the public enterprises were no longer financially capable of 
ensuring the most basic maintenance of the assets. The public sector financing constraints 
were so binding that the choice was between rationing and increased private sector 
                                                 
1 Private local small scale operators have in fact always been any where the public sector has not delivered and has had 
a particularly strong role in the poorest countries where service coverage in energy, water or transport offered by large 
public or private utilities is limited.  
2 As for many typologies, this one is arbitrary. There are obviously other possible factors such as the excess supply of 
funds on the international capital markets during the 1990s. But these are less directly related to the topic to be 
addressed by this paper.    2
financing.  The “privatization” dimension of the ideological revolution can thus be seen 
as one of the consequences of this fiscal crisis.
3       
Because competition has its limits in most network industries, the “privatization” 
component of the reforms transferred some monopolistic segments of the industry to 
private operators.
4 This is the case for energy and water distribution and for their 
transmission or transportation. It is the case for regional monopolies in airports, ports and 
rail. In many countries, it is also the case for the local loop in telecoms.  The existence of 
these private monopolies involved in the delivery of public services resulted in a de facto 
fourth mini-revolution during the 1990s. This revolution is in the internal organization of 
the residual public sector role in public services.  Historically, self-regulation of the 
public monopolies had prevailed and generally produced few incentives for cost effective 
efficient service delivery. The reforms of the role of the government included a major 
change in the organization and implementation of regulation. This was intended, at least 
on paper, to address this incentive problem to contribute to the reduction in the financing 
requirements of the sector.  
The debate on the regulation of the private monopolies has not been an easy one. 
It has centered on two main dimensions. The first was the extent to which countries 
needed to have independent regulatory agencies to reduce the risks of conflict of interest 
and of corruption in the regulation of the sector. This debate is important but beyond the 
scope of this paper.  The second was the extent to which regulatory regimes could 
actually move toward efficiency oriented systems. More specifically, the debate was how 
to follow the lead of the United Kingdom and increase the incentives for efficiency for 
operators to promote cost reductions. These cost cuts would eventually be passed on to 
users through tariff reductions or to taxpayers through reductions in subsidy 
requirements.  
The extent to which this efficiency dimension has been internalized by 
policymakers and academics in developing and transition economies is the main topic of 
this paper. The last 4-5 years have seen a small explosion of applied research on 
economic efficiency related issues in developing and transition economies.
5 Many of the 
papers are quite useful at the policy level generating regulatory insights quite different 
from those gained from the analysis of regulatory outcomes in developed countries. 
Many have also proven that while the data problems are constraining, the constraints are 
not as binding as often argued.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a quantitative sense 
of the spread and types of reforms that have taken place.  Section 3 provides an overview 
of the research on efficiency measures in developing countries, including a discussion of 
the evidence on the efficiency effects of reform so-far. Section 4 discussed some of the 
alternatives to standard efficiency measures available to regulators. Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
3 “Privatization” is an excessive word when it comes to public services. The actual sale of public assets to private 
operators has only been relatively common in some dimensions of the electricity generation, telecoms and the service 
component of the transport sector. In most other segments of the business, concession contracts, licences or leases have 
ensured the continuation of public property of the assets in the long run.  
4 Competition for the market helped in addressing the residual monopoly issues but not as much in developing 
countries as it did in developed economies. See Estache, Guasch and Trujllo (2003). 
5 There is also a significant literature on other efficiency concepts such as operating efficiency but these usually rely on 
partial performance indicators which are of limited use for economic analysis, in particularly in the context of 
regulatory or reform decisions. These are thus not covered in this paper.    3
 
2.  Overview of the reforms  
 
Table 1 summarizes the results of a survey on the extent to which there is at least 
some corporate private sector participation in electricity  distribution, telecoms, water & 
sewerage, and railways across regions of the world.
6 On average,  a smaller proportion of 
the developing countries are sharing the responsibility for service delivery in these 
industries than in developed countries. In general also, it seems that among developing 
countries, the richest countries have been more systematic at engaging in reforms to 
attract the corporate private sector. 
7 
 
Table 1: How present is the private sector in Network industries? 
(Share of countries in total number of countries) 




Railways  Telecoms 
Developing Countries  36%  35% 37% 48% 
Developed countries  43%  80% 65% 83% 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa  28%  20% 47% 41% 
East Asia  20%  64% 43% 38% 
Eastern Europe  48%  62% 20% 58% 
Latin America  61%  41% 56% 67% 
Middle East  6%  18% 20% 23% 
South Asia  13%  13% 17% 50% 
Source: Estache and Goicoechea (2004) 
 
There is unfortunately no equivalent encompassing survey for the type of 
regulation used in reforming economies. There are however a few partial surveys which 
all point to an increased concern for the explicit consideration of efficiency in the choice 
of regulatory regimes. The largest survey is for a sample of about 1000 contracts in Latin 
America.
8 The database contains detailed information on the characteristics of these 
concessions, including general details about the projects (sector, activity, year of award), 
the award criteria, size and duration of the concession, information with respect to the 
institutional context and degrees of freedom of the regulator, the type of regulatory 
framework put in place (price cap, rate of return, no regulation), and several details of the 
concession contract like arbitration clauses, nationality of operators, among others. In this 
rather encompassing data base, 56% of the contracts were regulated under a price cap 
regime, 20% under rate of return regulation. For 24% of the contracts, the regime is a 
hybrid one meaning that roughly 80% of the contracts signed in that region will require at 
some point some consideration of the efficiency gains achieved by the operators. 
Equivalent but smaller surveys for utilities were conducted in Africa and Eastern Europe. 
In all cases of water or electricity distribution covered by these surveys a price cap of 
some sort was adopted. Even if there may have been a selection bias in those surveys, 
                                                 
6 More details in Estache and Goicoechea (2004). 
7 From now “private sector” is meant to mean “corporate private sector” since we ignore the role of small 
scale operators in the survey.  
8 For a full description, see Guasch (2003).   4
their results tend to confirm the domination of incentive oriented regulation wherever a 
reform has taken place.
9  
The initial enthusiasm for the inclusion of efficiency in the design of regulation in 
developing countries is however being adjusted in developments observed over the last 2-
3 years. The first development worth mentioning is that there is a significant slowdown in 
the presence of large volumes of private capital in the financing of infrastructure services 
in developing countries since the 1997 East Asia crisis. In many countries, the next 
generation of contracts seems to be moving toward management contracts or new designs 
of the 1970s performance contracts with heavy potential financing from donor agencies 
but with a stronger role for the private sector in the management and delivery. This 
means that the role of the regulators is likely to move from a focus of the efficiency on 
total expenditures to a focus on assessing separately the efficiency of operational and 
capital expenditures on a systematic basis because these activities may be subject to 
separate contracts. In many other countries, this means that the public sector will 
continue to be an important actor in the sector. This does not eliminate the concern for 
efficiency. In many countries this implies the adoption of corporatization strategies which 
all included an efficiency focus similar to one built-in in any collaboration with the 
private sector.   
The second emerging development is a move away from pure forms of price or 
revenue cap toward more hybrid regimes. These regimes are hybrids because they 
include a clear focus on efficiency even if they often recognize that some of the cost 
categories will enjoy automatic or trigger driven pass-through to the users. This is most 
obvious in the renegotiation of contracts documented by Guasch (2004), but also in the 
initial design of contracts in electricity in Latin America for instance (Estache and Rossi 
(2004)). From the viewpoint of a regulator, this means that the coverage of the business 
over which regulatory decisions are based on mostly efficiency measures principally is a 
shrinking portion of the total. The specific share of the costs enjoying automatic pass-
through varies across sectors but is largely dominated by activities subject to exchange 
risks (e.g. imported inputs and foreign debt service) or activities subject to negotiated 
long term arrangements (e.g. labor contracts). Efficiency gains are clearly continuing to 
be important for the other cost components. It could be argued that since the marginal 
effort on cost saving is likely to be concentrated on a narrower part of the cost structure, 
the relative importance of the efficiency measure is likely to increase.      
  The third evolution is the increased interest in national or international 
performance benchmarking in developing countries. The most obvious indicator is the 
number of regional associations of network regulators. The first one was for the 
regulators of energy of Latin America created in the late 1990s. Since then, equivalent 
associations are functioning for the water sector in Latin America and for all utilities in 
Africa, Eastern Europe, South Asia and since 2003 in East Asia. In all cases, there is an 
effort to generate consistent information across countries for the same sector. Progress is 
slow however, and international databases directly useful for standard economic 
efficiency measurement are not yet common—except for energy in Latin America and 
water and sewerage in Africa and in East Asia. In some countries as in Mexico or Peru in 
                                                 
9 Estache and Goicoechea (2004).   5
the port sector, the regulators have gone one step further in the benchmarking direction. 
They are working on the implementation of a formal system of yardstick competition 
between national ports but this is work in progress.  
 
3.  Overview of the evidence on efficiency in developing and transition economies 
 
In spite of the sufficiently long experience with infrastructure reform in 
developing and transition economies, there is very little policy experience with the formal 
use of these measures in regulatory processes. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,   
Mexico and Peru are the only six countries in which a formal assessment has actually 
been made as part of formal tariff revisions—to our knowledge. There is however a 
growing academic interest among the regulation specialists as well as among public 
sector specialists as discussed below.  The interest is not concentrated in Latin America. 
The issue is also being discussed in various African and Asian countries including China, 
India, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Korea, Mali, Malaysia, Mauritania, Senegal and Uganda   
although not necessarily as part of formal tariff revisions. Moreover the survey shows 
that there are many regional benchmarking exercises covering Africa, Asia, the 
Caribbean or South America. The issue is also attracting a number of researchers in 
developing countries. The rest of this section provides a brief overview of the relevant 
literature for each subsector, distinguishing between utilities and transport. The 
distinction is done to reflect the real life sector separations in developing countries. In 
many countries indeed, when regulation takes place, the two main institutional models 
are: (i) a sector specific agency or (ii) a multisector agency. Increasingly, countries are 
adopting multisector agencies but they do so by bundling utilities and transport in 
separate agencies.




Utilities are usually defined as covering energy (excluding oil and gas production), 
water & sewerage and telecoms. In this survey, we focus on the energy and water & 
sewerage sectors because there is actually very little literature on the measurement of 
efficiency in the telecommunications sector in developing countries.
11 Most of the 
literature focuses on partial performance indicators and uses standard econometric 
techniques to explain those indicators.
12 There is also an important literature relying on 
cost proxy models, initially developed for the US telecoms, to assess efficiency and 
                                                 
10 Interestingly enough, in most countries, the telecom sector usually enjoys its own regulator. This is usually the result 
of the fact  that telecoms were the first to be reformed and the creation of an agency was often part of the reform 
package. 
11 Interesting exception are Das (2000) who use of translog cost function to argue for the need to arbitrate between loss 
of scale and scope economies and competition in further restructuring of the Indian telecoms and Facanha and Resende 
(2004) who makes the case for quality adjusted performance indicators , Resende and Facanha (2004) who make the 
case for yardstick competition in the sector in Brazil  and Colson and Mbangala (2003) who assess the effects of 
reforms in Africa’s telecoms sector during the 1990s. 
12 Gutierrez (2003) offers a very readable survey of the literature.   6
address other regulatory issues. 
13 But both of these areas go beyond the scope of this 




The literature on this sector is growing fast but it has many common features.  We 
identified almost 30 papers, reported in Table 2, covering full systems, generation only or 
distribution only.  Most of the papers are on the electricity sector. Only two deal with the 
gas sector in developing or transition economies and both are on Argentina, the only 
country in which a tariff revision including a discussion of the revision of the cap actually 
took place. 
14 
Most papers focus on a single output. In most cases, they focus on the production 
side of the business but cost data are much more difficult to obtain. DEA is the most 
common approach. There is an unusually large number of papers relying on both non-
parametric and parametric approaches to check the robustness of the results or of the 
policy conclusions.  
Most of them (over 50% of the papers) rely on country specific data. This is 
because in many countries, the reforms have created many business units which can be 
compared with each other. Among developing countries, Latin America is the most 
studied region, reflecting the payoff of the efforts made by the Latin American 
Association of Energy Regulators to generate comparable data.  
In general, when authors focus on the cost side of the business, the main difference 
across papers comes from the differences of the expenditure type they focus on: 
operational, capital expenditures or total expenditures. The papers focusing on the 
production side deal with either the number of clients served or total energy sold. Since in 
many countries the operators tend to control more the energy supplied than the number of 
customers--in general operators are subject to connection obligations, not necessarily to 
service obligations at any tariff-- the most common proxy for output is energy sold.  
As in all other sectors, the choice on the input side is generally driven as much by 
data availability as it is by economic principles. The number of employees is the standard 
labor input and is easily obtained. For the capital inputs, however, the options are more 
difficult. Transformer capacity is widely accepted as a required variable. Many authors 
also consider kilometers of distribution lines, which measure (with some approximation) 
the amount of network capital. There is however a recognition that it can reflect 
geographical dispersion of consumers as much as differences in productive efficiency. 
The main lesson is that network capital can thus be treated as an output or as an input but 
it is necessary to control for geographical dispersion. Generally, with a single equation 
production frontier, it is treated as an input.
15 As suggested by Kumbhakar and 
                                                 
13 The conceptual framework is presented in the book by Gasmi et al. (2002) and their 2000 article. An illustration for 
Argentina is provided in Benitez et al (2001).  
14 This section is to a large extent a major update of the papers reviewed in Jamasb and Pollitt (2001). 
15 Since physical measures of capital (as the ones used in this study) cannot capture all the capital equipment used in the production 
process (aside of the difficulties to account for differences in asset quality, age and composition), an alternative is to represent all 
capital in a single monetary measure. However, creating monetary measures of capital is problematic because accounting methods and 
revaluation policies are not uniform within organizations. Furthermore, there is still debate over the correct method of calculating the 
monetary value of capital.   7
Hjalmarsson (1998), there are many instances in which it makes sense to focus on labor 
productivity only, rather than to rely on methods which make implicit assumptions on the 
joint evolution of factor efficiency and this is being increasingly recognized in the recent 
literature. 
Regarding the environmental variables included in the models, service area is an 
exogenous (scale) operating characteristic of the firm’s environment. When the number 
and type of customers served can be assumed to be exogenous, it is often also included as 
a control variable of some sort—often customer density to get to the demographics 
impacting the sector; the higher the density the higher the productivity. Differences in 
voltages required by customers may matter and hence the need to model the share of 
residential vs. non-residential users.  On the quality side, it is not unusual for researchers 
to include a variable representing the security of supply, peak-load demand, technical 
losses and outages. Finally, cross-country papers also include GNP per capita to control 
for differences in the socio-economic environment in which firms operate in each 
country. 
An interesting additional feature of this literature is the willingness of some authors 
to rely on 2-stage processes to assess  the impact of the institutional or policy variables. 
These authors compute the efficiency scores in a first stage. They then rely, in a second 
stage, on a regression to explain these scores with various types of variables. The 
econometric models used vary from simple OLS to Tobit or Probit models.  
The large set of papers available and their diversity provide a set of useful lessons. 
The main one may be that there is a clear interest in benchmarking performance in the 
sector. Benchmarking can be done to simply generate performance rankings. This was 
common in the first multi-country studies (Whiteman (1995, 1998) or Pollitt (1995)) and 
continues to be a popular use of the methods including at the country level  (Lavado 
(2004) for the Philippines). Benchmarking can also be done to generate a sense of the 
scope for tariff reductions in the case of specific tariff revision as is the case for the 
papers on Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru where consulting firms of more 
academic regulators have worked on generating efficiency measures. Finally, 
benchmarking can be used to promote some form of yardstick competition within 
countries or across countries as argued by Domah (2004), Estache, Rossi and Ruzzier 
(2004) or Resende (2002). In general, the publications tell a fairly powerful story. For 
Latin America, for instance, the efficiency gains achieved are of the order of 5-7% per 
year. This is not negligible and significantly higher than what was estimated for the gas 
sector in Argentina for instance. 
These benchmarking studies generate a number of other useful results. First, Pollitt 
(1995) relying on both parametric and DEA techniques as well as second-stage regression 
to use institutional variables to explain differences in efficiency scores for each segment 
of the electricity systems as well as the full systems suggests that there were no 
significant differences for LDCs from the average of other countries in the early part of 
the 1990s.  These results have been globally confirmed by Whiteman (1995, 1998). 
Relying on a larger set of countries, he finds that efficiency levels in developing countries 
were very roughly equivalent to those in Australia and  Japan, the United States or lower 
than in Europe but much higher than in Canada or the Asian Tiger economies—Hong 
Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan.  He also finds that the “baby tigers”—  8
Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia—were average performers as well. 
Note that the specific rankings vary with the methodology used (DEA vs. SPF). 
Second, these studies also provide some sense of the major environmental variables 
to consider as part of the reform agenda. Pollitt (1995) was quite careful at correcting for 
environmental variables in his detailed study of segments of the sector. Lam and Shiu 
(2004) focusing on the generation side of the business test in a second-stage regression 
the relevance of institutional variables as well as capacity, size and age variables for the 
capital inputs and the quality and availability of fuel. They find that autonomy, location 
and coal endowment all contribute to the good ranking of an operator. They also find that 
these factors can be sufficient to offset the negative effects of a lack of size of an 
operator. Melo and Espinoza (2004) find that higher population density improves 
efficiency scores. 
Third many of the authors find that size matters to both generation and distribution. 
Yumos and Hawdon (1997) were the first to suggest that scale is an issue in the sector in 
all countries from cross-country evidence which included developing economies. 
Meibodi (1998) finds a similar result for Iran and Pacudan and de Guzman (2002) for the 
Philippines. These results are also  confirmed by Filippini et al (2004) for a transition 
economy. They go further in using their results to argue that reformers should consider 
promoting the merger of the smaller distribution utilities in Slovenia.  
Fourth, the literature also provides a sense of the actual importance of the much 
debated role of ownership and regulation in the sector. In general, the impression is that 
privatization has been associated with improvements in efficiency but only with or 
through other reforms. Bagdadioglu et at. (1996) may have the most positive result and 
show that  private distributors have better technical and scale efficiency on average. They 
do however also show that some public operators have scores equivalent to those 
observed for private operators. Yumos and Hawdon (1997) find ownership change is only 
useful to improve efficiency with increases in competition. Estache and Rossi (2004) 
complement this result for distribution companies in Latin America. They show that 
privatization is not the important variable but regulation is. Productivity increases with 
degree of incentives built in regulation but privatized firms under rate of return have at 
most similar labor productivity as public firms. Similar results are obtained by Pombo 
and Ramirez (2002 and 2004) for Colombia). In a rare African case study,  Plane (1997) 
assesses for Cote d’Ivoire the impact of the privatization of management with no labor 
dismissal allowed on technical efficiency and the distribution of the effects among users 
and owners. He shows that efficiency improved but irregularly and was never as efficient 
as when under public management and tight budget constraint. The users did benefit from 
lower prices and quality improvements. Motta (2004) complements the assessment by 
showing for Brazil that privatization had no statistically significant impact on technical 
efficiency when using OPEX as an input but resulted in a strong drop in technical 
efficiency when considering total expenditures. There is some uncertainty on the 
economic meaning of the result since it may reflect a surge in investment or a substitution 
between capital and labor post privatization. Berg et al (2004) show in the case of 
Ukraine that privatization can be good but bad regulation can lead to perverse incentives 
and deteriorate efficiency scores. Cost plus regulation has been used more effectively by   9
private operators to increase shareholder value through cost inflation which has been 
passed on to users through higher tariffs. 
Finally, many of the papers on Latin and South America have shown that it may be 
useful to try to distinguish between technological and efficiency changes. One of the 
main results in this context is that reforms contribute to improve both of these efficiency 
sources. The two studies by Pombo and Ramirez (2002, 2004) on Colombia are 
particularly well documented on this point.  
 
Table 2: Energy 
Region Data  Reference  Method  Policy  relevance 
World  768 thermal power plants 
operating in 14 countries, 
including South Africa and 
Thailand 
1989 





Finds that privatization does not lower costs in the short 
run for the industry once allowance was made for 
ownership, load or country. Government interference 
with investment decisions do however increase costs.  
World  111 electricity generation systems 
1989-1995 (unbalanced panel) 
Whiteman (1998)  DEA/SFP  Finds  that  levels  in developing countries were very 
roughly equivalent to those in Australia, Japan, the US 
or lower than in Europe but much higher than in  Canada 
or the Asian Tiger economies (specific ranking driven 
by method). 
World  32 companies from Austria, 
Netherlands, UK and 1 
Argentinean 
Frontier 
Economics  and 
Macroconsulting 
(2001) 
DEA  Consultant report prepared for the regulator to 
benchmark the performance of one Argentinean 
distribution company in preparation for its price review. 
LDCs  85 electricity systems  Whiteman (1995)  DEA  Benchmarking exercise. 
LDCs  1. Cross-section of generation for 
27 countries in 1987 
2. Panel of electricity  generating 
utilities from Malaysia, Thailand 
and the UK for 1975-1990 period 
Yumos and 
Hawdon (1997) 
DEA  Points to major efficiency gaps between small scale and 
large providers; also finds that changes in ownership do 
not resolve efficiency problems automatically when 
there is no competition. 
South 
America 
30 South American Distribution 
companies from 10 countries 
1994-1998 
Rodriguez-
Pardina,  Rossi and 
Ruzzier (1998) 




36 South American Distribution 
companies from 10 countries 
1994-1998 
Rodriguez-Pardina 
and Rossi (2000) 




84 Latin American Distribution 
companies 
1994-2001 






Makes the case for an international yardstick 
competition regulatory regime and discusses and 
illustrates the implementation challenges in the context 
of Latin America. 
Latin 
America 
Panel of 127 Latin American 
Distribution companies 
1994-2001 





Shows that productivity increases with degree of 
incentives built in regulation. Private under rate of return 




Panel data of generation 
companies for 16 small island 
economies vs. 121 investors 
owned US generators 
1993-2000 




Shows that use of non-small islands in benchmarking is 
feasible and desirable. 
Interconnection influences efficiency scores and changes 
performance incentives. 
Argentina  Panel of 8 gas Argentinean 
distribution companies 
1970-1995 
NERA  (1997)  TFP  Estimate that using customers are proxy for output, 
annual X to be used in tariff revision should be around 
2.4%. 
Argentina  Panel of 8 gas Argentinean 
distribution companies 
1993-1997 
Rossi (2001)  SPF  Major catching up and frontier shift during the period 
for all operators. 
Brazil  Cross-section of 24 distribution 
operators 
1997/1998 data 
Resende  (2002)  DEA  Argues for relative efficiency scores in the design of a 
national yardstick competition regulatory regime in 
Brazil.   10
Brazil  A report for each of the 64 







TFP and basic 
performance 
benchmarking 
Each operator generated a report explaining how they 
assessed all variables and how they estimated efficiency 
gains and subjected it to assessment of regulator. 
Brazil Distribution  companies 
1994 and 2000 
Motta (2004)  DEA/SPF  Privatisation has no statistically significant impact with 
OPEX as input but results in strong drop in technical 
efficiency when considering Total expenditures. 
May reflect surge in investment or substitution between 
capital and labor. 
Makes case for inclusion of capital costs in any 
benchmarking exercise. 
Chile  35 empresas de distribucion Sanhueza  and 
Rudnick (2004) 
DEA  Relies on DEA Efficiency measure to assess the 
electricity  distribution value added. 
Chile  35 empresas de distribucion Sanhueza  and 
Rudnick (2003) 
DEA/SPF  Analyses levels and sources of differences across 
operators. 
Shows novel use of bootstrapping techniques to asses 
each operator’s efficiency. 
China  Panel of 30 municipal , 
autonomous regions and 
provincial thermal generation 
plants 
1995-2000 






Shows that average annual TFP growth rate was 
2.%/year on average. 
Confirm earlier results on relevance of location. 
Fuel efficiency and capacity also mattered. 
China  Panel of 30 municipal, 
autonomous regions and 




Lam and Shiu 
(2001) 




Find that location (coastal vs. interior), coal endowment, 
fuel efficiency, capacity and autonomy from the central 
government, are important determinants of efficiency. 
Find no evidence of excess capacity. Find no evidence 
of relevance of FDI. Point to labour redundancy issue. 









Shows that the reforms of the 1990s improved the 
average efficiency levels of the sector; regulatory policy 
had positive effect but ownership has no conclusive role. 






DEA  Meaured for each operator the efficiency gains to be 
used in assessment of authorized transmission tariff for 
2003-2007 period (1.63%-2.51% depending on tension 
level). 
Colombia  Panel of 20 distribution 
companies 
1999-2003 
Melo and Espinoza 
(2004) 
DF-P  No significant changes during the period covered; 
environmental variables matter significantly—the higher 
the population density, the higher the efficiency.  









Shows that the reforms of the 1990s improved the 
average efficiency levels of the sector. Technology 
improvements and regulatory policy had positive effect 
but wedge between good and bad performers increased. 
Iran Benchmarks  Iranian  companies 
with LDC sample 
Meibodi  (1998)  DEA/SPF  A large share of differences in efficiency can be 
explained by plant size. 
Ivory Coast  Time-series 
1959-1995 
Plane (1999)  SPF  Finds significant but irregular efficiency gains from the 
privatization of management. In addition finds that users 
gained through lower tariffs from efficiency gains. 
Peru  Panel of 19 distribution operators  
1995-1998 






Relative efficiency assessment for the Peruvian 
Distribution operators. 




Pacudan and de 
Guzman (2002) 
DEA  Used to simulate effects of energy efficiency policy 
measures on productive efficiency.  
Highlight the importance of scale efficiency. 
Philippines 119  electricity  cooperatives Lavado  (2004)  DEA/SCF  Ranking of operators. 
Estimates annual TFP growth  at 1.7%, explained evenly 
by a frontier shift and catching up. 




and Zoric (2004) 
SCF  Paper makes a case for merger of excessive number of 
small scale operators. 
Turkey  Cross section of 70 Turkish  Bagdadioglu, Price  DEA  Shows that private distributors have better technical and   11




scale efficiency on average but some public operators 
have equivalent scores. 
Ukraine  24 Ukrainian electricity 
distribution companies 
1998-2002 
Berg, Lin and 
Tsaplin (2004) 
SPF/DEA  Shows that private operators respond more aggressively 
to incentives than do public operators. When regulation 
has perverse incentives efficiency worsens. 





3.1.2.  Water and Sewerage 
While the share of contracts signed with private operators and regulated under some type 
of incentive based regime is about as high as it is for the energy sector in developing and 
transition economies, somewhat surprisingly the number of studies covering the sector is 
quite limited. We found 8 studies, of which only 4 are actually published and 3 more have 
actually been issued as working papers by an academic or official institutions. The last one is 
a mimeo. Table 2 shows that half the papers rely on parametric techniques, 3 on DEA and 1 
on an index number. Most studies focus on the production side. Volume of water produced or 
sold and volume of sewerage collected or number of connections tend to be the most 
common output variables. A few focus on the cost side and then the issue is on what cost to 
focus on (operational, capital or total?). 
Table 3: Water and Sewerage 
Region  Data  Reference  Method (*)  Policy relevance 
Africa  21 African water utilities, 








Find that private operators are more cost-
efficient and that corruption worsens efficiency; 
also show that corruption matters much more 
than ownership. 
Africa  110 African water utilities 
1998-2001, including 14 
private  
Kirkpatrick, 






Finds no significant difference between public 
and private operators in terms of cost once 
environmental factors have been accounted for. 
Regulation has no significant impact either. 




SCF  Find no statistically significant difference 
between public and private operators in the 
sector. 





TFP  Find a significant improvement resulting from 
the 1990s reforms in the sector.  
Also shows that one of the renationalized 
companies is managing to maintain private 
gains. 
Show that ignoring the multiproduction nature of 
the operators business (water + sewerage) leads 
to misleading policy conclusion on the 
performance of operators.  







Ranking of operators. 
Makes the case for yardstick competition.  
Brazil  Around 4000 (depending 
on the year) municipalities 
of Brazil  
1996-2002 
Seroa da Motta 
and Moreira 
(2004) 
DEA  with 2
nd 
stage regression 
Private operators stimulate catching up but there 
is no significant difference between public and 
private operators in terms of the total variation in 
productivity. Regional operators benefit from 
scale economies but have the lowest productivity 
levels. Municipalities have the highest 
productivity levels. 
Peru 43  operators 
1996-1998 
Corton (2003)  SCF 
 
Cost models which accounts for location, 
dispersion, size in production and size in 
administrative responsibility (number of districts   12
covered). These factors account for 90% of 
differences in costs. 
Makes a cost based case for mergers of some of 
the companies. 
Documents lack of incentives of operators. 










Ranking of operators for a 3 years  period. 
Find returns to scale. 
Find important role for environmental variables. 
(*) SPF: Stochastic Production Frontier; SCF Stochastic Cost FrontierDEA: Data Envelopment Analysis; TFP: Total factor 
productivity index number; 
  For the papers focusing on cost, labor cost, other input costs, production levels, 
number of clients, population density, water sources (e.g. surface, ground,…), and quality 
variables tend to be standard. Increasingly also, analysts add environmental variables, 
including institutional characteristics. Note that these models are sometimes run with 
quadratic forms to get non-linearities in the technology, including possible returns to 
scale. For the papers focusing on the production side of the business, employment, fuel 
and other energy consumption, network size and other expenses are the most common 
found. The specific functional forms and variable choices are of course driven by data 
availability. 
There are few overall policy lessons from these few studies but those emerging from 
a comparison of experiences across regions and countries are important. Probably the 
most important lesson is that the econometric evidence on the relevance of ownership 
suggests that in general, there is no statistically significant difference between the 
efficiency performance of public and private operators in this sector. The only paper on 
Asia (Estache and Rossi (2002) and the paper using the latest data on Africa (Parker and 
Saal (2004) are both quite robust at that level. An earlier econometric study on the 
efficiency of the African companies found, with a much smaller sample, some superiority 
for private operators but the efficiency effect of ownership was much lower than the 
effect of good governance in the sector. This mixed review of the efficiency payoff of 
private sector participation may have to be correlated with the observation that water is 
the sector with the highest rate of renegotiation. According to Guasch (2004), 75% of the 
water contracts signed in Latin America during the 1990s were renegotiated.  
The story is however not that simple. Indeed, the first published country specific 
paper on this issue in this sector shows the high efficiency payoffs of the privatization 
policy for 4 Argentinean provinces based on the calculation of a Malmquist index 
(Estache and Trujillo (2003)).  Annual efficiency gains vary from 2.3% for the largest 
concession to 13.5% for one of the smaller ones. Note that the first average is over an 8 
year period and the second over a 3 year period. The difference is at least partially 
explained by the fact that the biggest bang for the buck of privatization in these industries 
is immediately after the reform since the operators know that they will eventually have to 
share with the users the efficiency gains as part of a scheduled tariff revision. This is in 
fact illustrated by Seroa da Motta and Moreira (2004) in their recent working paper when 
they document that private operators stimulate a quick catching up but don’t get 
associated to frontier shifts more than public operators in this sector in Brazil. 
The second lesson to emerge is that there is a clear case for increased yardstick 
competition in the sector, independently of whether the private sector plays a crucial   13
role.. Tupper and Resende (2004) provide a very pragmatic illustration of how this could 
work out in a large country, adapting Bogetoft (1997 and 2000). The various papers on 
Peru may not be as precise in making the case but  the efficiency measures used to rank 
operators could easily be built in the Tupper-Resende model. Similarly, the various 
papers on Africa provide the raw material to design a yardstick competition system 
across sufficiently similar countries within a region.    
Third, various papers document the importance of accounting for environmental 
variables in this sector. The papers on Peru for instance, in particular Corton (2003), are 
extremely careful at assessing the relevance of a range of variables which are not under 
the control of the regulated operators. Location, population dispersion, and number of 
municipalities in the area of responsibility all contribute significantly to differences in 
performance across operators.  
Fourth, it is quite important to recognize that operators are in practice involved in a 
multiproduct operation. Most provide water but also generally collect sewage. Estache 
and Trujillo (2003) show that ignoring the multiproduct nature of the business in 
Argentina would have resulted in an overestimation of the efficiency gains achieved since 
reforms. For the operators for which the data were available, the estimated annual 
average efficiency gains dropped from 4.2% to 2.6%.  
Finally, the size issue and the concern for scale economies is a recurring theme. The 
various African studies all recognize that the samples used do not do justice to the large 
role played by small-scale operators. There is however not enough data available to make 
a fair assessment of the interface between small and large actors in the sector. Corton 
(2004) has enough data to show that in the Peruvian context, it could make sense to 
promote some mergers in view of the room available for scope and scale economies in 
the sector in that country. 
3.2. Transport 
The demand for efficiency studies in transport comes about differently than for 
utilities. Transport operators tend to face much more competition than most of the 
utilities operators. There is thus apparently a lesser role for regulation in this sector. This 
is probably true for most inland transportation and most obviously passenger transport 
where the variety of modes provides enough options to choose from. For freight, the 
situation is more complex. The competition between trucks and railways is generally 
strong enough for inland transport even if in railways there are regulatory issues related 
to captive shippers and access rules--but these are relatively easy to address. Competition 
is however not as effective in the port sector. Indeed, it is increasingly clear that many of 
the efficiency gains achieved from inland transport competition and railways reforms get 
wasted in the port sector.
16  In a recent paper, Clark et al. (2004) show that improving 
relatively marginally port efficiency could reduce shipping costs by about 12%. From the 
viewpoint of transport regulators it is thus quite important to get a sense of the potential 
cost savings that could be achieved. The remainder of this section reveals a surprising 
low interest of policymakers and researchers in addressing this issue for developing 
                                                 
16 See for instance the discussion in the European context in Gonzalez, Tovar and Trujillo (2004).   14
countries. There are indeed very few policy relevant quantitative papers on economic 
efficiency on either ports or railways.   
3.2.1. Ports 
 
Ignoring the large literature on partial performance indicators in the sector, the 
academic coverage of economic  efficiency in the port sector is quite scarce indeed in the 
world in general. Focusing on developing countries reduces the number to 8 articles as 
seen in Table 4. The main interests of these studies vary significantly across these few 
papers. They go from an attempt to establish a link between ownership and efficiency to 
the generation of rankings for benchmarking purposes or to estimates of the efficiency 
gains to be used as part of a tariff revision. Some of the studies tend to be cross-country 
and those often cover both Asian and European countries as benchmarks. Others focus on 
specific countries such as India, Korea or Mexico. Somewhat surprising it is often 
difficult to know exactly what is being measured. Few of the studies are in indeed 
specific as to which part of the port sector they are focusing on.  Based on the data used, 
it seems that the most common output measured is cargo handling services.  
Table 4: Ports 
Region  Data  Reference  Method (*)  Policy relevance 






Cullinane, Song, Ji 
and Wang (2004) 
DEA  Shows that the efficiency of container terminals 
fluctuates significantly over time.  







Notteboom, Coeck  
and Van Den Broeck 
(2000) 
DEA  Compares efficiency of 36 European terminals and 4 
Asian. Assessing the performance drivers, they find 
that the most efficient are North European, the largest 
terminals, the terminal in hub ports and the private 
terminals.  
Asia  Panel of 15 
countries 
1989-1998 
Cullinane, Song and 
Gray (2002) 
SPF  Shows that privatization has improved efficiency of the 
Asian port system. 




De and Ghosh (2002)  TVPF  Trying to explain the relation between productivity, 
efficiency and technological change, they show that 
increases in capital use improved productivity in India.  
Korea  Cross section of 
11 Korean ports 
1999 
Park and De (2004)  DEA  Suggest a  4 stages DEA to highlight efficiency issues 
ignored by simple DEA. 
Korea  Panel of 5 Korean 
and UK ports  
1978-1996 
Song, Cullinane and 
Roe (2001) 
DEA  Comparative assessment of Korean and UK container 
terminals. Shows positive impact of increased private 
sector participation.  




and Trujillo (2002) 
SPF  Proposes a specific measure for the X of the Mexican 
price cap adopted for the regulation of infrastructure in 
the  sector. Shows that the reforms improved that X 
significantly in all ports. Suggests how X measure 
could be used for yardstick competition. 
Mexico  Panel of 14 
Mexican Ports 
1996-1999 
Estache, Tovar and 
Trujillo (2004) 
DEA  Shows how efficiency measures can be used to infer 
demand shocks by illustrating the impact of the East 
Asia crisis on the performance of ports authorities. 
(*) SPF: Stochastic Production Frontier; DEA: Data Envelopment Analysis; TVPF: Time Varying Production Function. 
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DEA tends to dominate the methodologies. There are however many methodological 
debates among port specialists and efficiency specialists. For instance, Park and De 
(2004) using data on 11 Korean ports for 1999 compare all the methods available and 
suggest a new 4 stages DEA to increase the robustness of the results. There is also a more 
conceptual debates on the number of port activities that need to be covered by efficiency 
studies. The matter is not a simple one since many of the activities are competitive while 
a few, more obviously the port infrastructure, are not. Moreover, while it is obvious to all 
that there is a complementarity between all activities, there is no uniform view on how to 
address it in the context of efficiency measures or even whether it needs to be addressed. 
For instance, some argue that all equipment, including equipment owned and operated by 
independent competitive providers, must be included in the assessment of the 
performance of the port authorities responsible for the basic infrastructure. Many more 
disagree with this vision arguing instead that there is an interest in assessing the 
performance of the regulated monopoly independently of the performance boost or 
penalty that independent competitive providers may generate. At best, when information 
is available, the competitive segments of the port should enter as environmental variables.  
In practice, the response to the debate is generally settled by data availability. In 
general, the focus of the assessments in ports tends to be the production side rather than 
the cost side mainly because of data constraints. But these constraints are so binding that 
they also drive other choices. They explain why most articles focus on Cobb-Douglas 
rather than Translogs. Most studies also focus on data panels than time series. There are 
however a few very real policy aspects that cannot be ignored. For instance, most studies 
explicitly recognize the multiproduct nature of the port business, although a few focus on 
aggregate output measures. The most common is to see a disaggregation between general, 
dry-bulk, liquid-bulk and containerized cargo. On the input side, labor and capital tend to 
be present in every study. Everyone seems to agree on the labor variable but there is no 
consistency in the way the capital variable is being measured. Only a few studies have 
accounted for environmental variables (i.e. Is it a mainland port or an island? Is some of 
the cargo delivered by pipeline? …).  
It may be useful here to point to some very pragmatic implementation issues in the 
estimation of efficiency in the sector. It is not unusual also to see changes in the 
definitions of some of the variables during the periods of assessment. In the case of labor 
for instance, reforms tend to lead to major outsourcing policies. In this context, the 
employment data may end up comparing apples and oranges over time if the researcher is 
not careful. Indeed, the post reform data would only pick up employees under the port 
authority payroll and cover the others under the costs of service contracts. The risk is 
however limited for studies focusing on port authorities since they tend to be quite 
narrowly focused and are associated with very little outsourcing. For studies attempting 
to have a wider coverage of port services, the issue is more problematic. 
With these limitations in mind, the few papers available provide a number of useful 
lessons. These can be separated in two types. From a market structure viewpoint, the 
research provides useful insights to any policymaker in developing countries. First, with 
respect to size, Cullinane et al. (2002) show that the size is directly influencing 
efficiency, at least in container terminals. Second, container terminals located in hub 
ports tend to be more technically efficient than those in feeder ports as documented by   16
Notteboom, Coeck and Van den Broeck (2000). Third, Cullinane et al. (2004) point to the 
high degree of fluctuation of efficiency over time documented from a sample of 25 
container terminals, including some in developing countries.  This point is also made by 
Estache et al. (2004) when discussing the impact of the demand shock due to the East 
Asia crisis on the Mexican ports located on the Pacific coast of the country.  Fourth, 
based on the Indian experience, De and Ghosh (2002)  document the role of the access to 
capital and its degree of use to the level of efficiency of the sector comparing data from 
1981-1982, and 2000-2001 for 12 Indian ports. Fifth, there are many factors driving the 
efficiency of a port. A few of the papers try to assess systematically the various sources 
of changes in efficiency. This is the case of  Estache et al. (2004) for instance which 
computes a Malmquist TFP growth index and then relies on a distance function to 
decompose it into technical, scale  and efficiency changes. 
From a reform viewpoint, the main lessons are the following. First,  the results on the 
relevance of ownership and the impact of reforms suggest that private ownership tends to 
improve efficiency in the sector in developing countries. Indeed, Cullinane, et al. (2002) 
show this in their analysis of 15 Asian container ports during the 1989-1998 period and 
Notteboom, Coeck and Van den Broeck (2000) reach similar conclusions.  Second, 
increased competition and decentralization of port authorities improves efficiency as 
shown by Estache et al.. (2002 and 2004) in the case of Mexico. Third, benchmarking is a 
realistic regulation mode for the sector. Many of the papers are concerned with 
benchmarking some specific ports or port systems. Tongzon (2001) for instance 
compares the Australian ports to a set of best practice international ports for 1996 using a 
DEA.  Estache et al. (2002) for instance shows how efficiency measures can be used to 
promote yardstick competition in the sector in a very pragmatic way. The analysis is done 
for 14 Mexican port authorities during the 1996-1999 period. The paper includes a 
discussion of how the use of efficiency measures can be used to shift the burden of proof 
on the operators in the context of scheduled or unscheduled tariff revisions. Container 
terminals located in hub ports tend to be more technically efficient than those in feeder 
ports as documented by Notteboom, Coeck and Van den Broeck (2000) .  
 
3.2.2. Railways 
The railways sector also suffers from a low coverage by the academic and regulatory 
literature offering quantitative assessment of economic efficiency in developing and 
transition countries as seen in Table 5. Technically, these papers are not very different 
from those on developed countries in terms of the choices of methodologies. Indeed, a 
few of them pool data from OECD and non-OECD countries to generate performance 
rankings in the sector.  
Most of these papers deal with the two main characteristics of the railways sector 
which have long attracted the interest of researchers interested in measuring economic 
efficiency: multi-output production and natural monopoly. Railway companies have 
traditionally operated passenger and freight trains simultaneously on their own networks, 
either at the national or at the regional level. As seen in the Argentina and Brazil papers 
however, this was changed by the reforms of the 1990s in many countries. Indeed, in 
these two countries, long distance passenger service has essentially be reduced to a 
minimum. Intercity infrastructure is for freight and local suburban traffic is mostly   17
passenger with a few instances in which tracks are shared locally—and regulatory 
conflicts arise.   
 
Table 5: Railways 
Region  Data  Reference  Method (*)  Policy relevance 
World 46  countries 
1998-2000 
Lan and Lin 
(2003a) 
DF  Distinguishes between efficiency and service 
effectiveness. 
Focus on comparison of methodologies and 
rankings. 
Shows relevance of environmental variables. 
World 44  countries 
1995-2001 
Lan and Lin 
(2003b) 
DEA  Highlight relevance of non-traditional 
performance indicators (e.g. sales 
effectiveness relating to marketing). 
Focus on comparison of methodologies and 
rankings. 
Argue that conventional models understate 
productivity. 
Shows relevance of environmental variables. 
World  85 rail systems 
1999 
Lan and Lin 
(2002) 
DEA/SPF  Comparison of methods and their use. 
Shows that LDC and transitions systems are 
less efficient that OECD in a much larger 
margin than expected. 
America including 




Rivera-Trujillo SPF  (DF)  Finds  that  technological change effect (2.2% 
annual average) is higher than technical 
efficiency for most countries. 
South American have lower growth rather 
than North America. 
Sub-Saharan Africa  9 countries 
1970-1990             
Mbangala and 
Perelman (1997) 
Sequential DEA  Small companies and companies with higher 
passenger shares perform better. 







Provides a regional ranking of operators. 








Updates previous ranking of operators. 
Shows that Interconnection and multimodal 
transportation need to be developed. 
Argentina and Brazil  Argentina: 









Trujillo (2001)  
TFP index  TFP growth rates paths revealed the strategic 
behavior of companies in a price-cap 
regulatory regime. 











Incentive work when made as explicit as 
possible in the design of regulatory regimes. 
(*) SPF: Stochastic Production Frontier; EA: Data Envelopment Analysis; TFP: Total factor froductivity index number 
 
A second interesting characteristic of this literature is that because cost minimization 
assumptions tend to be impossible to measure due to lack of data,  most performance 
studies deal exclusively with physical output and input quantities and most are interested 
in production efficiency measurement only. In general ton-km or train-km are the main 
output measurements for freight and passenger-km for passengers. The main inputs tend 
to be employment, km of tracks—electrified or not--, rolling stock, energy—
distinguishing between the various sources.  This very pragmatic approaches have not   18
stopped the methodological debates as seen in the two papers by Lan and Lin (2003a and 
b) who echo many of the debates between researchers interested exclusively in OECD 
countries. 
In terms of the main regulatory and policy lessons provided by this modest literature, 
the following stand out. First, all the multicountry studies highlight the importance of 
environmental factors in the absolute and relative performance of operators. Lan and Lin 
(2002, 2003 a and b) are quite keen to argue that case and do so effectively. The authors 
find great differences among companies as expected. The main contribution is however 
to show that these differences are partially explained by the degree of development (GDP 
per capita), the technology used (% of electrified lines), and the density, both of the 
population and of the network lines. More dramatic maybe are the studies on Sub-
Saharan countries (Mbangala and Perelman (1997) and Mbangala (2004a and b)). They 
reveal the strong impact on performance of the dramatic political disturbances in Africa. 
These disturbances are quite obvious in the railway performances of the national 
companies of Congo-Brazzaville (CFCO), Democratic Republic of Congo (SNCC) and 
Kenya (KRC) that suffered of great efficiency losses, mainly during the 1995 to 2001 
period. Note that these authors also point out the dramatic increase in competition  from 
the trucking industry resulting from improved road network coverage and the poor inter-
modal and inter-network coordination in Africa as important environmental variables 
they have not been able to pick up in their assessments.  
Second, the literature also offers useful insights on the impact of reforms and in 
particular “privatization” of railways services. The results presented in Mbangala (2004a 
and b) also allow a comparison of the evolution of the performance of two railway 
companies privatized in 1999 (CEAR from Malawi and CAMRAIL from Cameroun).
17 
Both managed to stay in a good position close to the frontier too. But the author points 
out  that both companies, like others in the sample, owe their improved performance to 
strong reductions in inputs (staff number and rolling stock) rather than improvements in 
outputs (passenger or tons kilometer transported). The author’s conclusions highlight the 
main problems under scrutiny: organizational and management issues, maintenance 
problems in relation with the age of equipment (rolling stock and tracks).  
The other two papers reported in Table 5 assessing the impact of reforms offer a 
contrasting story based on the experience of two of the most dynamic Latin American 
reformers in the sector: Argentina and Brazil. In both countries, the reforms undertaken 
in the 1990s consisted in the separation of passenger and freight transportation and, 
contrary to the European Union deregulation reform, no vertical separation between 
infrastructure and operation activities was introduced. Estache et al. (2001) estimate TFP 
growth indexes for Brazilian freight railways companies before and after privatization 
(around 1996) and find that improvements after the reform (8% by year) were mostly due 
to output increases, contrary to improvements before the reform (5.5% by year) 
exclusively attributable to reduction inputs, particularly labor. In Argentina the freight 
and commuter networks were originally owned as an integrated public enterprise, 
therefore the comparison of performances before and after the reform are less 
informative. This is the reason why the authors estimate TFP growth indexes for the 
                                                 
17 Other national companies in the sample were privatized as well but outside the period covered by the data, in 2002 
and 2003.    19
period 1994 to 1999 after privatization exclusively. In both, freight and passenger 
transportation sectors, most companies reached high rates of productivity growth, 5.3% 
and 9.8% on average, respectively. And, as in the case of Brazil’s privatization, this 
increase is mainly concentrated on the output side. These results are globally confirmed 
by Estache et al (2004) with more recent data for Brazil. 
Third, the literature also provides some useful insight on the timing of the efficiency 
effects of reform. In particular, Estache et al. (2001) also show that the major gains in 
efficiency realized by freight companies in Argentina and Brazil were achieved in the 
first year of operation. They also find that toward the end of the period efficiency drops 
for all the operators monitored. This tends to confirm the expectations derived from the 
use of price cap regimes with regular tariff revisions.  
Fourth, the paper by Rivera-Trujillo compares the performance of the main North and 
Latin American railway systems and finds that between 1980 and 1999, the South lagged 
the North significantly on all efficiency counts. Particularly interesting is the observation 
that it also lagged the North in terms of the internalization of technological change. On 
average also, for that continent and during that period, technological change was higher 
than technical efficiency change. 
Fifth, the recent paper by Estache, Trujillo and Perelman (2004) points to the 
importance of an integrated approach in dealing with safety and output concerns in the 
regulation of railway service. They do so by modeling an interesting innovative feature of 
the Brazilian “privatization” intended to ensure a close monitoring of the quantity-quality 
trade-off. With a price cap regime in the background, the privatization team spelled out, 
for each concession, two specific targets about output and safety, in terms of minimum 
net ton-kilometers carried each year and maximum number of accidents per train-
kilometer during the first five years.  The modeling approach relies on a non-parametric 
(DEA) index, introduced by Färe et al. (1995), which shows how operators chose 
between output and quality. The most relevant results reported in Estache et al. (2004) 
show that the contribution of quality, represented by safety and speed indicators, to 
productivity change was negative during the public management and transition periods, -
0.7% and –2.3% a year, respectively, while it contributed positively to productivity 
change, 3.9% a year, during the last period after the reform. In other words, private 
operators have improved efficiency in terms of both quantity and quality.  
Finally, the various papers covering large sets of countries providing both 
passenger and freight services provide useful insights on the relevance of the size of the 
network and the complexity of the operations. One of the main results in Mbangala and 
Perelman (1997) for instance is that on average, small companies and companies 
operating proportionally higher shares of passenger transport perform better.        
 
4.  The measurement of efficiency for regulators is a competitive business 
 
It may be useful in this survey to point out that the market of efficiency measures for 
regulators is much more competitive than often assumed. Stochastic or deterministic 
frontiers or DEAs are not the only game in town. There is indeed an increasing presence   20
of alternatives to standard economic efficiency measures in “real life” regulatory 
processes.  
The most common form of alternatives are engineering-economic models 
developed in recent years as an alternative to the traditional econometric and accounting 
approaches to cost assessments. Engineering models offer a more detailed view of cost 
structures than is possible using econometric data. Because econometric models rely on 
assumptions of (smooth) functional forms, engineering process models offer a more 
detailed view of cost structures than is possible using econometric data.  
There are two approaches. The first is common in the telecom sectors. Since the 1996 
US telecom reforms, a number of countries have relied on forward-looking cost proxy 
models based on a best practice optimization model of investments in the sector. In 
practice, these economic cost proxy models begin with an engineering model of the 
physical local exchange network, and then makes a detailed set of assumptions about 
input prices and other factors. These hybrid cost models are increasingly being used or at 
least considered by Latin American and African telecoms regulators to assess forward- 
looking efficient costs in the context of the assessment of regulatory decisions associated 
with universal service obligations or interconnection charges.
18 Some of the consultants 
who worked on these models are now trying to develop equivalent products for the 
energy sector.  
A second type of engineering model used more in the water and energy sectors  in 
some of the Latin American countries is the “model-operator” model. In a nutshell, the 
model-operator model is the idealization of the operation of a business by engineers and 
focuses on production processes and the best practice associated costs. Chile in Latin 
America (and Spain in Europe) has tried it in some of its regulated activities. It is now 
also being used in Argentina as part of the definition of the government position in some 
of its utility contract renegotiations. Bustos and Galetovic (2002) provide an overview of 
the various aspects of this approach in the Chilean context. Grifell-Taje and Lovell 
(2003) offer a very useful comparison of the “ideal distribution network” as designed by 
a consultancy firm with the efficiency estimated from traditional “economic” techniques 
for Spain’s electricity system. They show that the ideal network would have been in 1996 
about 29% less costly to operate but that the incumbent managers were actually more cost 
efficient than the “ideal model” being more effective at exploiting opportunities for 
improvements in allocative efficiency under the existing regulatory regime.    
Both approaches seem to still be fairly specialized but they need to be seen as 
indicators that there are many ways of getting to the efficiency measure to be used in any 
incentive based regime. 
 
5. Concluding  comments 
 
All things considered, while the list of papers covered by the survey is relatively 
short, it provides quite an interesting set of lessons. The lessons to be drawn are of two 
types: policy and technical. 
                                                 
18 For a quick read on the topic, see Benitez et al. (2004) or Laffont, et al (2003)   21
  At the policy level, the main lesson may be the difference in the relevance of 
ownership for efficiency between utilities and transport. In transport, private operators 
have tended to perform better than public operators in developing countries. For utilities, 
it seems that in general ownership often does not matter as much as sometimes argued. 
Most cross-country papers on utilities find no statistically significant difference in 
efficiency scores between public and private providers. As for the country specific 
papers, some do find differences in performance over time but these differences tend to 
matter much less than a number of other variables. Across sectors, the more relevant 
variables include the degree of competition, the design of regulation, the quality of 
institutions and the degree of corruption. A second lesson is that incentives work. Indeed, 
across sectors, private operators functioning in a competitive environment or regulated 
under price caps or hybrid regulatory regimes tend to catch up faster than public 
operators. There is however no obvious difference in terms of frontier shift. A third 
policy lesson is that there is a very strong case to push regulators in developing and 
transition economies toward a more systematic reliance on yardstick competition in a 
sector in which residual monopoly powers tend to be common. The use of these methods 
for simple rankings is quite widespread. It could go one step further as it has done in 
some OECD countries and use the information generated to actually drive cost and hence 
prices lower.  
  At the very technical  level, to state the obvious, analysts interested in the 
efficiency of infrastructure services in developing and transition economies tend to have 
more data problems than analysts focusing on developed economies. Only a few 
countries are managing to generate analyses of quality comparable to those observed in 
OECD countries. Most are in Latin America. Moreover, among the 4 sectors covered 
here, only the energy sector seems to have enough information to allow the generation of 
policy relevant analyses comparable to those available for OECD countries.  
    There are  three main data problems. The first is the measurement of capital. This 
problem is however not a simple one even in developed economies.
19 The size of the 
problem is however somewhat surprising for recently privatized operators in view of the 
fact that typically, privatizations involve in-depth assets valuations. The second is the 
difficulty of modeling correctly the size of employment in view of the increased trend to 
outsource many activities in this sector. The third data problem comes from the poor 
accounting standards of most developing countries and the weak commitment to 
regulatory accounting standards by privatization teams who seem to sometimes be more 
interested in the deals than in their sustainability. Most of these problems can be handled 
through assumptions, tests designed to ensure the robustness of the results or refocusing 
of efficiency assessments towards results with which analysts feel comfortable. However, 
the more technical the debate becomes, the larger the wedge between the supply of 
efficiency analysis and the demand by regulators.  
The need to address this wedge is a serious challenge, and may not be specific to 
developing country regulators. In general, the supply of efficiency work seems to be 
dominated by overly technical papers. Yet, the demand from the incentive based 
regulation is for specific assessments of potential cost reductions which can be passed on 
to users and by a concern for an unbundling of the source of changes in efficiency 
                                                 
19 Coelli et al. (2003) allocated a 13 pages annex to the issue in their book targeted to infrastructure 
regulators.    22
between those that can be addressed by regulators and those that cannot. In a nutshell,  
regulators generally want to know about average rates of change and their decomposition 
more than anything else.  
The mismatch between the demand and the supply may reflect the fact that the 
“efficiency practice” is generally made of  econometricians or mathematicians with little 
training in real world economic regulation while the “efficiency users” are generally 
regulatory economists, engineers or lawyers and other specialists with not enough 
quantitative skills. Oversimplifying the supply to meet the demand will not do much good 
to the fairness of regulation but shooting for perfection is likely to ration the demand 
because it is likely to be overly technical. The challenge is for the “practice” to move 
toward the demand while minimizing the concessions to quality standards. This challenge 
is the bread and butter of any applied economist hoping to be policy relevant without 
sacrificing his/her academic credibility.   23
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